


























PROBLEM SITUATIONS INVOLVING THE QUESTION OF 
INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL 
SEA 
For many years State A. had claimed a territorial sea of three miles 
but recently by presidential proclamation had extended it to six 
1niles.* State B, adjacent to and south of State A., has long claimed 
a six-mile territorial sea. State B did not protest State A.'s territo-
rial sea extension; however, other states have filed formal protests. 
Ships bound to and from State B, including merchantmen, fishing 
vessels and warships, customarily used a sea lane located between three 
and five miles off the southern coast of State A. for a distance of about 
100 miles. At the northern end of this 100-mile stretch, which was 
approximately one-third of the length of State A.'s coastline, the sea 
lane veered away from State A.'s coast and out into the high seas. 
Until State A.'s recent presidential proclamation this sea lane was 
entirely high seas opposite State A.'s coast, but now it "\vas well within 
the newly-declared territorial sea. 
A. recent change in the government of State B brought to power 
several men who were unfriendly to the leaders of State A., and who, 
it was widely rumored, had designs on part of State A.'s territory 
nearest State B. 
Officials of State A. had ob~served recently an increase in the number 
of ships of State B ·w·hich were traversing and occasionally anchoring 
in the territorial sea of State A., usually between the three and six-
mile limits, but often inside of the three-mile limit. 
State B was known to have nuclear weapons, a large high seas fish-
ing fleet, and a good -sized navy. 
State A. took a number of steps to augment her security against pos-
sible attack, particularly by State B, including the following: 
( 1) State A. built a number of detection installations along her 
entire coast, including the northern portion of her territory which 
"\Vas sparsely populated. 
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NOT DRAWN TO SCALE 
Diagram of problem situations right of innocent passage. 
' ' 
(a) All foreign submarines must navigate on the surface of 
State A's territorial sea and show their flags; 
(b) All foreign warships must give State A 24-hour prior noti· 
fication of the intended passage through State A's territorial sea; 
(c) All foreign warships must have their radar equipment se-
cured* when passing through State A's territorial sea, except when 
'veather conditions make navigation by visual devices hazardous; 
(d) All fo~eign vessels are forbidden to use State A's territorial 
sea if they have nuclear weapons aboard; 
* "Secure," as used here, means "to lock up," "to put away," or "to make 
unavailable for use." 
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(e) All foreign vessels are forbidden to use State A's territorial 
sea if they are transporting any \Var materiel bound to State B; 
(f) All foreign fishing vessels are required to secure their fish-
ing gear when passing through State A's territorial sea. 
Several states officially acknowledged receipt of these regulations 
but State B did not. I-Iovvever, a discussion of the regulations ap-
peared in the press of State B, including adverse comments by "unoffi-
cial sources" who claimed that State A was guilty of aggressive action 
taken against State B. 
Subsequently the following events took place within State A's six-
n1ile territorial sea. Which, if any, were violations of the right of in-
nocent passage under the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1958? What actions could 
State A take to prevent or punish what it considered to be violations 
of the right of innocent passage through her territorial sea? 
EVENT I 
A submarine, The Sailfish, was observed surfacing approximately 
five miles off State A's shore about two miles north of the border 
between the territorial seas of States A and B. It proceeded south 
for a short distance without showing its flag, then stopped and 
anchored. "When challenged by a naval vessel of State A, The Sail-
fish identified herself as belonging to State B and hoisted her flag. 
When questioned by State A's vessel as to why she had anchored in 
State A's territorial sea, The Sailfish weighed anchor and proceeded 
into her own territorial sea without responding. 
EVENT II 
A warship, The El Toro, of State B, without giving prior identi-
fication to State A, departed from a port in State B and proceeded 
into the territorial sea of State A approximately three miles off the 
coast, heading in a northerly direction in the customary sea lane. 
The El Toro's radar equipment was in operation. Instead of follow-
ing the sea lane out into the high seas at a point about 100 miles from 
State A's southern border, as she had done on previous occasions, the 
El Toro proceeded up State A's coast within the territorial sea and 
intensified the use of her radar equipment. 
State A's detection stations observed the El Toro enter her terri-
torial sea and knew that her radar equipment had not been secured 
in accordance with State A's regulations. The detection stations and 
visual observation posts kept the El Toro under constant surveillance 
as it proceeded along the coast, expecting it to follow the sea lane out 
into the high seas. When it did not do so, State A signalled the war-
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ship to depart from her territorial sea immediately for having failed 
to give the required 24-hour notification and for failure to secure her 
radar equipment while in State A's territorial sea. The El Toro fi-
nally left State A's territorial sea but continued to cruise northward 
along the coast outside of the six-mile limit. When opposite the 
northernmost portion of State A's territory in an area of the high seas 
little used for navigation or fishing, the El Toro cruised back and forth 
conducting a gunnery exercise, firing both nuclear and non-nuclear 
weapons sea ward. During this exercise the El Toro was outside the 
six-mile limit except during one of her maneuvers when she was a short 
distance inside State A's territorial sea for a limited period of time. 
EVENT Ill 
A merchant ship, The Queen Bee, of State X, following the custom-
ary sea lane adjacent to the southern portion of State A, was pro-
ceeding in a southerly direction never closer than four miles to State 
A's coast toward a port of State B with a cargo which included some 
military equipment. 
Officials of State A had good reason to suspect that The Queen 
Bee was carrying the military cargo to State B. 
State X had long claimed a three-mile territorial sea and was one 
of the states which had filed a formal protest when State A extended 
her territorial sea from three to six miles by presidential proclamation. 
After travelling a short distance within the territorial sea as 
claimed by State A, The Queen Bee was challenged by a warship of 
State A and escorted outside the six-mile limit. 
Later State X filed a formal protest with State A claiming (a) 
that State A's extension of her territorial sea from three to six 
miles had no validity under international law, and (b) that assum-
ing, without admitting, the validity of State A's six-mile territorial 
sea, State A had no right under the Geneva Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone to deny the right of innocent pas-
sage to a vessel carrying military cargo, no matter where it was 
bound. 
EVENT IV 
A fishing vessel, The Pelican, of State B, returning from a suc-
cessful fishing trip in the high seas, was observed by officials of 
State A late one afternoon about two miles off State A's coast, ap-
proximately one mile to · the land ward of the customary sea lane, 
proceeding at about four knots toward her horne port. 
The Pelican was some twenty miles north of the border between 
States A and B, in an area of State A's territorial sea known to be 
good fishing waters. 
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Although the fishing nets of The Pelican were not secured in accord-
ance with State A's regulations they were not in the water. Officials 
of State A, not knowing that The Pelican's holds were already full 
of fish, were suspicious that she might be planning to fish after dark 
en route to her home port. 
State A's officials, after observing members of the crew of The 
Pelican taking hand-line soundings and sea bed samples as the vessel 
cruised southward, ordered a warship to visit and search her in order 
to determine (a) why The Pelican was proceeding so slowly through 
State A's territorial sea, (b) why she was approximately one mile 
landward of the custo1nary sea lane, and (c) why her crew members 
were taking soundings and sea bed samples. 
During the visit and search which took only thirty minutes, officers 
of the warship accidentally discovered among the crew a Mr. 1{., a 
citizen of State A wanted in State A for several :felonies. :1\fr. K. 
was arrested and taken aboard the warship, after which The Pelican 
was escorted outside the six-mile limit for having violated the right 
of innocent passage. 
ANALYSIS 
A. EVENT I (Submarine surfacing within the territorial sea, an-
choring, and failing to fly flag.) 
It seems clear that when State B's submarine, The Sailfish, sur-
faced within State A's six-mile territorial sea it violated Article 14(6) 
of the Geneva Convention which provides that "submarines are re-
quired to navigate on the surface and to show their flag." Since 
The Sailfish surfaced about five miles off State A's coast, it must have 
travelled submerged for at least a mile in the territorial sea. 
While other states which claim a narrower territorial sea than six 
miles, say, three or four miles, would not be bound by State A's ex-
tension of her territorial sea of the additional three~ miles unless there 
was an implied accession to the extension after ample time for pro-
testing, it would be untenable for State B to object because she her-
self claims six miles.1 Therefore, as to State B the extension by 
State A of her territorial sea from three miles to six miles is binding 
both because State B claims six miles and because of the implied 
assent in State B's failure to file a protest. State B's submarine is 
required to navigate on the surface within State A's six-mile 
territorial sea. 
1 Rights claimed unilaterally by states vis-a-vis each other are reciprocal in 
the sense that one state generally may not deny to another state a right which 
it is claiming for itself unless (a) the right is exclusive to the first' state (e.g., 
the exclusive right to fish in a state's own territorial sea, or exploit the natural 
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The failure of The Sailfish to show her flag until challenged to do 
so was also a violation of the Convention. Although the draft articles 
of the International Law Commission provided only that "submarines 
are required to navigate on the surface," without requiring a showing 
of the flag, the Conference wisely included this latter provision as 
added protection to the coastal state. 
\Vhether The Sailfish violated the Convention in stopping and an-
choring is debatable. Such action is permitted under Article 14 ( 3) 
"but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or 
are rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress." 2 The Sail-
fish might be able to show that her stopping and anchoring were in 
confor1nity with the provisions of the Convention. However, refusal 
of The Sailfish to respond to State A's question as to why she had 
stopped and anchored suggests the absence of any distress, force ma-
jeure, or that the submarine's action was in fact incidental to ordinary 
navigation. 
resources of its continental shelf) ; or (b) the right is predicated upon unusual 
circumstances which are generally recognized in the world community as giving 
rise to the special right (e.g., a state such as Norway with a deeply indented 
coastline may claim the right to use straight baselines from which to measure 
the breadth of the territorial sea and deny to a state with a smooth coastline 
the right to use the same basis of measurement). (Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Oase, I.O.J. Reports, 116 (1951) ; Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone, Art. 4) ; or (c) the right is an "historic" one which has been long recognized 
(e.g., historic bays, etc.). 
But, aside from these major exceptions, one state must accord to other states 
in the international community the same rights which it is claiming for itself. 
Hence, a state claiming a six-mile territorial sea under the facts given here 
would be in an untenable position in denying the validity of an equivalent claim 
by another state. 
It should be emphasized, of course, that although one state may be bound by 
a fortiori reasoning from denying to another what is being claimed for itself, this 
fact alone does not bind other states which claim something less. For example, 
the fact that Chile, Ecuador and Peru have claimed sovereignty over a 200-mile 
breadth of high seas would preclude their objecting if some other state made a 
similar claim. However, this fact does not establish the 200-mile claim as the 
new customary international law of the territorial sea. Similarly, the fact that 
State B in the problem situation claims a six-mile territorial sea and hence must 
accord that same right to ·state A under the facts given, does not mean that the 
six-mile limit thereby becomes international law. While it is true that wide-
spread state practice develops a customary international law by the process 
of reciprocal interaction and accommodation of competing claims, the practice · 
must be sufficiently inclusive of the major claimants to justify a finding of 
the emergence of a new customary international law. In the case of a question 
involving the law of the sea such as the breadth of the territorial sea, a six-
mile limit could not be claimed as the new international law, absent an .accession, 
express or implied, by a majority of the major maritime states. 
2 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 52 (1958). 
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Hence, unless State B provides a sat isfact,' ry answer to State A's 
question regarding the reason for the stopping and anchoring by The 
Sailfish, it may be concluded that this action, like the other two, was 
in violation of the Convention. 
B. EVENT II (Passage of State B's warship without 24-hour notifi .. 
cation.) 
The first and foremost question is ·whether warships have the r ight 
of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Clearly the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone guarantees the right 
of "innocent passage" to such ships as ·well as to other types of vessels. 
Section I I of the Convention is headed "Right of Innocent P assage" 
and Sub-Section A is entitled "Rules applicable to All Ships." 3 
Moreover, in Article 14 'vhich follows immediately after Sub-Section 
A, paragraph six relates to a specific type o:f warship, namely, sub-
marines, expressly providing that "submarines are required to navi-
gate on the surface and to show their flag." 4 This provision indicates 
exactly what this particular type of warship must do in two respects in 
order not to violate the right of innocent passage. 
That the Internationa.l La'v Commission intended the right of in-
nocent passage to apply to warships, subject to the express right of 
the coastal state under Sub-Section D to impose regulations on war-
ships is indicated by the commentary to its final articles which, under 
the heading, "Right of Innocent Passage," says that "the general 
rules laid down in sub-section A . . . apply to the ships referred to 
in sub-sections C and D, subject to the reservations stated there." 5 
It is true that the above commentary is somewhat in conflict with 
Article 24 of the International Law Commission's final draft articles 
which would have required prior notification and authorization for 
warships to pass through territorial seas, indicating that it would 
not be a right of the flag state but a privilege which could be granted 
or withheld. Indeed, the last sentence of this Article 24 begins, "Nor-
mally it (the coastal state) shall grant innocent passage .... " 6 
However, it will be remembered that this proposal of the Interna-
tional Law Commission was omitted from the Convention, clearly in-
dicating that innocent passage through the territ~rial sea was 
considered by the Conference to be a right of warships, as well as for 
all other vessels, and not merely a privilege which the coastal state 
might grant or withhold. 
Dr. El-Erian of Egypt staunchly maintains that the record of the 
Geneva Conference indicates that warships do not have the right 
3 U.N. Doc.. A/CONF. 13/L. 52 (1958). 
(Ibid., at Art.14(6). 
5 U.N. Doc. A/3159, 18 (1956). 
6 Ibid., at 22 
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o£ innocent passage. 7 Professor Sorensen o£ Denmark also believes 
that the majority o£ delegates did not intend warships to have this 
right, although he admits £rankly that "the actual text o£ the Con-
vention would therefore warrant the conclusion that warships have 
the same rights in this respect as other ships. . . . " 8 A careful an-
alysis o£ the record o£ the Geneva Conference supports the conclusion 
that the majority of states favored the right o£ innocent passage £or 
warships and drafted the provisions o£ the Convention accordingly. 
With all due deference to advocates o£ a contrary vie'Y, on this matter 
they are in error. 
Finally, perhaps as strong evidence as any that the Convention does 
guarantee the right o£ innocent passage £or warships is the £act that 
members o£ the Soviet bloc who were most opposed to granting this 
right to warships,9 almost uniformly filed reservations to Article 23 
o£ the Convention at the time o£ signature, the net import o£ which 
is to reduce the right o£ innocent passage to a mere privilege in their 
own territorial seas. Typical is the reservation o£ the U.S.S.R .. which 
provides, 
"The Government o£ the Union o£ Soviet Socialist Re-
publics considers that a coastal State has the right to estab-
lish procedures £or the authorization o£ the passage o£ foreign 
warships through its territorial waters." 10 
Similar reservations to Article 23 were also filed by Bulgaria, 
Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the Ukraine.11 
Colombia filed a declaration regarding Article 23 along the same 
lines, using a curious and inapplicable analogy to the passage o£ 
foreign troops through Colombian territory, saying, 
". . . [U] nder Article 98 o£ the Colombian Constitution, 
authorization by the Senate is required £or the passage o£ 
foreign troops through Colombian territory and that, by 
analogy, such authorization is accordingly also required £or 
the passage o£ foreign warships through Colombian terri-
torial waters." 12 
It is obvious that i£ the states indicated above had not £elt that the 
Convention guarantees the right o£ innocent passage to warships, they 
7 U.N. General Assembly Official Records 13th Sess., 6th Comm. AI C. 6/SR. 590, 
14 (1958) (provisional record). 
8 Sorensen, "The Law of the Sea," International Conciliation, No. 520, 244 
(1958). 
9 See arguments of Yugoslav and U.S.S.R. delegates in 3 Official Records 
(A/CONF. 13/39, 129 (1958)). 




'vould not have made a reservation to the Convention to deny the 
right by making passage subject to prior authorization by the coastal 
state. 
EVENT ll (Passage of warship without giving prior notification) 
The next question is whether the warship, the El Toro of State B, 
violated the Convention by not giving prior notification to State A of 
its intention to enter State A's territorial sea. 
The final articles of the International Law Commission contained 
a provision which made the passage of warships through the terri-
torial sea subject not only to prior notification but also previous au-
thorization. However, the Convention contains no such provision. 
Therefore, it would appear that State B had no duty to State A to 
give prior notification. 
On the other hand, Article 23 of the Convention gives the coastal 
state the right to impose regulations concerning the passage of war-
ships as follows: 
"If any warship does not comply with the regulations of 
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial 
sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made 
to it, the coastal State may require the warship to leave the 
territorial sea." 13 
Except for a slight change in wording, this article is the same as 
Article 25 of the final draft of the International Law Commission. 14 
The question then arises as to whether a coastal state may include 
among its regulations one requiring prior notification since the Con-
vention eliminated that specific provision from its articles, along with 
the one permitting the coastal state to require previous authorization. 
It could be argued that since this specific provision as to prior 
notification was placed in a separate article by the International Law 
Commission, the more general article permitting the coastal state 
to impose regulations was not intended to go so far as to permit a 
regulation requiring prior notification (and authorization). If the 
general article permitting regulations had contemplated such safe-
guards to the coastal state as prior notification and authorization, it 
would have been superfluous to have stated them . in a separate 
article. 
13 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52, Art. 23 (1958). 
14 U.N. Doc. A/3159, 23 (1956). The commentary by the I.L.C. following this 
Article (25) is not at all helpful in indicating why the Article was drafted as 
it was, nor in explaining the kinds of regulations contemplated. The com-
mentary merely says: "The article indicates the course to be followed by the 
coastal State in the event of failure to observe the regulations of the coastal 
State." 
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On the other hand, it see1ns more logical to argue that the right 
of a coastal state to impose regulations concerning passage of \var-
ships through its territorial sea includes the right to impose \vhatever 
regulation is reasonable, considering all of the circumstances in con-
text. The question, therefore, is whether the requirement promulgated 
by State A requiring a 24-hour notice prior to passage of \varshi ps 
through its territorial sea is reasonable, even though the Conference 
did not include it in the Convention as a specific right of the coastal 
state. 
At this point it seems desirable to distinguish clearly bet-vveen the 
right of a coastal state to demand notice from another state of the 
intended passage of a warship through the territorial sea and the right 
of a coastal state to grant or withhold authorization. The matter of 
giving notice imposes a slight duty upon the warship state, but the 
right to the innocent passage is guaranteed if the prior notice is given. 
The only act involved is that of the warship state in giving notice. 
On the other hand, th.c requirement of prior atttthorization places a 
serious burden and limitation on the ·warship's right of innocent pas-
sage, reducing it to a mere privilege which the coastal state may negate 
by denying authorization. The right to the innocent passage is made 
subject to a judgment and an act by the coastal state-i.e., the decision 
whether to grant or withhold authorization and the granting of the 
authorization, plus the corollary right to refuse authorization or to 
'vithdraw it after it has been given. Hence, the matter of prior 
authorization contemplates an act by both states; the act by the war-
ship state in requesting permission, and the act by the coastal state 
in granting (or withholding) the permission. 
It was because this requirement of prior authorization would have 
eliminated the right of innocent passage for warships that it was 
rejected in the plenary meetings of the Conference.15 
Since the general requirement of prior notice does not affect the 
right of innocent passage, inflicting no more than a slight in con-
venience on the state which has to file notice, and since the specific 
115 The United States introduced a proposal in the First Committee to delete 
the article (Art. 2.4) requiring prior notice and authorization on the ground 
(a) that it contradicted Art. 15 which provided that ships of all States shall 
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea and (b) that it 
was unnecessary in view of the definition of "innocent passage" which gave the 
coastal State all the protection it needed. The United States proposal was 
withdrawn before being voted upon (3 Official Records 127) because other simi-
lar proposals such as that of the Netherlands (A/CONF. 13/C. 1/L. 51) were 
before the Committee. Although the requirement of prior notification and 
authorization was approved by the First Committee (3 Official Records (An-
nexes) 258, 260), this requirement was eliminated in the plenary meetings and 
omitted from the Convention. 
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requirement of 24-hour notice invoked by State A appears to be 
reasonable, especially in the case of State B of whom she has certain 
justifiable fears of possible aggression, it follows that State A had 
a right under Article 23 of the Convention to issue the regulation. 
Inasmuch as the warship of State B did not give the requisite 
notice, the question then arises as to what action n1ay be taken by 
State A. The language of Article 23 is not entirely clear on this 
question in the following respect. The article says that "the coastal 
State may require the warship to leave the territorial sea." However, 
this sanction is conditioned by a dual provision: "if the \Varship does 
not comply with regulations ... and disregards any request for con1-
pliance .... " Since this language is conjunctive rather than dis-
junctive, it could be argued that State A is entitled to ask the warship 
to leave the territorial sea only ( 1) after failure to co1nply 'vith the 
regulation, 'vhich failure has occurred, and (2) after disregarding a 
request for compliance. The facts indicate that State A made a re-
quest for the departure of the El Toro, but did not make a request 
for the compliance with the 24-hour notice prior to this request for 
the departure. Thus, if one interprets the language strictly it could 
be contended that State A could not request the departure from the 
territorial sea following the failure of the El Toro to comply "Tith the 
24-hour notice until State B had also received and disregarded State 
A's requested compliance. 
However, a more logical conclusion would seem to be that State A 
could request the departure from the territorial sea of the El Toro 
for the non-compliance with the 24-hour notice without also having 
to make a subsequent request for compliance because once the El Toro 
entered the territorial sea of State A it became impossible, at least 
for this trip, for State A to get or for State B to give the 24-hour 
prior notice. Hence, it would be illogical to require State A to request 
compliance by State B once the territorial sea of State A had been 
entered as a condition precedent to State A's right to require the 'var-
ship to leave the territorial sea. 
The language of Article 23 was probably written in its present form 
in order that a warship which had inadvertently or unknowingly 
violated some regulation of the coastal state concerning innocent 
passage through the territorial sea would not be required to leave until 
and unless she disregarded a request for compliance. However, the 
kind of compliance contemplated by the framers of Article 23 'vas 
surely that which would still be possible after the warship 'vas in the 
territorial sea, such as securing of radar equipment, and not some act 
such as the giving of 24-hour notice 'vhich after entrance of the terri-
torial sea was no longer possible. ' 
607631--61----10 
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EVENT ll (Passage of warship without securing radar equipment) 
The failure of the El Toro to secure her radar equipment was a clear 
violation of State A's regulation unless the vveather conditions were 
such as to make navigation by visual devices hazardous. Since the 
facts indicate that State A's visual observations were able to keep 
the El Toro under constant surveillance, it see1ns logical to assume 
that weather conditions ·were sufficiently good to enable the El Toro 
to see the shoreline and thereby navigate free from danger without 
using the radar equipment. Moreover, the fact that the El Toro 
navigated the full length of the coastline of State A and subsequently 
conducted a gunnery exercise is further evidence that the use of the 
radar was unnecessary for safe navigation. 
The next question-one which must always be asked with respect 
to all regulations in1posed by the coastal state upon warships (and 
other ships) exercising the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea-is whether the regulation relating to the securing of all 
radar equipment was reasonable. The requirement of reasonableness 
is not only implied in order to balance the equities between the need 
for a coastal state to maintain its security, and the need of the over-
seas state to navigate through territorial seas without undue impedi-
ments, but is clearly expressed as a duty of the coastal state in Article 
15 which provides that: "The coastal State must not hamper innocent 
passage through the territorial sea." 
Nothing in the facts indicates that State A's requirement that all 
·warships secure their radar equipment ·,vhen passing through the 
territorial sea, except when weather conditions would make navigation 
by visual devices hazardous, in any way contravenes the provision of 
Article 15 that the coastal state must not hamper innocent passage. 
Hence, State B would be required to abide by the regulation, absent 
so1ne evidence that it was either unreasonable or in son1e way ham-
pered innocent passage. 
From the standpoint of State A, since it is possible for State B's 
shipboard radar equipment to be used for mapping State A's coast, 
and in view of the known animosity of State B and the possibility 
of invasion by State B in pursuance of its claim to some of State 
A's territory, State A's regulation that all radar equipment be secured 
appears to be a reasonable security measure. 
One final question remains: whether under Article 23 State A could 
order the warship out of territorial waters for violating the regula-
tion regarding the securing of radar equipment without first making 
a request for compliance and having it disregarded. As previously 
indicated, in the discussion of the 24-hour prior notification pro-
vision, the most plausible reason for requesting compliance, following 
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a violation, before invoking the sanction of requiring the warship 
to leave the territorial sea is to prevent the hampering of innocent 
passage in the case of a ship which inadvertently or unknowingly 
violates a regulation and which would thereupon be asked to depart 
from the territorial sea without first being given a chance to comply. 
In the present case, although State B had not officially acknow 1-
edged receipt of State A's regulations, it may be assumed that they 
'vere received and known to the officials of State B because of the 
discussion in the press. Hence, the violation could hardly have 
occurred "unknowingly." 
Could the violation have occurred "inadvertently~" This also 
does not seem likely in view of the manner in which the radar equip-
Inent was being used. 
Thus it would follow that in a case like the present one the viola-
tion of the regulation, without the further requirement of the request 
for compliance, would be all that State A would have to show in 
order to justify the demand that El Toro depart from State A's 
territorial sea. Of course, since the El Toro did depart, although 
it re-entered later during the maneuvers, State A could not impose 
any further sanction under the Convention since the right of the 
coastal State to require the warship to leave the territorial sea is the 
only sanction provided. 
EVENT II (Passage of a warship through the territorial sea carry· 
ing nuclear weapons) 
The next question is whether State A has the right to forbid the pas-
sage through her territorial sea of all foreign vessels which have nu-
clear weapons aboard. 
One 'vay to approach this question is to inquire whether the Con-
ference included such a right in the Convention, either specifically or 
under a general provision permitting the coastal state to insure that 
the passage of foreign vessels through the territorial sea is "innocent." 
If the Convention does not contain a provision granting to the coastal 
state the specific right, did the Conference exclude this right which 
the coastal state is now trying to invoke~ 
A proposal by Yugoslavia was introduced in the First Committee 
of the Conference, but defeated by an overwhelming vote, which di-
rectly relates to this question. Yugoslavia proposed that, 
"The coastal State may deny the exercise of the right of 
i~nocent passage through its territorial sea to any ship carry-
ing any kind of nuclear 'veapon." 16 
16 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.l/L. 21 (1958). 
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The delegate from Yugoslavia said that the proposed new para-
graph was self -explanatory and reflected his government's belief that 
nuclear energy should be applied solely to peaceful ends and that in-
ternational law did not authorize its utilization for military 
purposes.17 
Before being voted upon the proposal 'vas changed at the suggestion 
of the Yugoslav delegate so that the word "ship" read "warship." 
Despite this change which would have limited the right of prohibition 
by coastal states to warships carrying nuclear 'veapons through the 
territorial sea, rather than all ships, the proposal was decisively re-
jected by 03 votes against, 7 in favor, with 22 abstentions.18 
By refusing to adopt th]s proposal, the First Committee clearly in-
dicated that the mere carrying of any kind of nuclear weapon on 
board a warship within the territorial sea of another state could not 
be prohibited. Therefore, it could be argued that the coastal state 
could not promulgate such a prohibition under the general provisions 
of the Convention which give the coastal state the right to do 'vhat is 
necessary to insure the innocence of passage of vessels through the ter-
ritorial sea because to do so in light of the Conference action on the 
Yugoslav proposal would be to permit the inclusion of a specific right 
to a coastal state (under a general provision of the Convention) 'vhich 
the Conference emphatically excluded. 
Although this argument is persuasive, it is by no means conclusive. 
That which is omitted from this or any other convention is significant, 
but parties to a convention are only bound by what is included therein, 
not by 'vhat was excluded. Moreover, it is well recognized that the 
various committees of the Conference on the Law of the Sea, as well as 
the plenary meetings, often eschewed the inclusion in the conventions 
of a specific right or duty because it felt that the matter could be 
treated more judiciously by incorporating a general right or duty. 
Such is the case with the articles in the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone which give the coastal state the right to 
"take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which 
is not innocent," 19 without specifying exactly 'vhat those necessary 
steps may include (or not include). Also the general rule of the Con-
vention applicable to warships gives the coastal state the right to 
pass "regulations" with which the warship must comply / 0 without 
indicating either the extent of those "regulations" or the limitations 
thereof. 
17 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 129 (1958)). 
18 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 131 (1958)). 
19 Art. 16 (1). 
20 Art. 23. 
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It may be concluded therefore that although the Conference re-
jected a specific proposal which vvould have given the coastal state 
the blanket right to prohibit all warships from carrying nuclear 
'veapons through its territorial sea, under certain circum~tances in-
volving danger to security the coastal state may include such a pro-
hibition as a part of the general rights which the Convention accords 
to the coastal state to regulate the passage of warships through the 
terri to rial sea. 
It will be remembered from the previous discussion of another de-
feated proposal, the one which would have given the coastal state the 
right to require prior notification and authorization before foreign 
'varships could pass through the territorial sea, it was concluded that 
the coastal state could require prior notificat ion because such notifi-
cation would not constitute such a burden upon innocent passage a.s 
to hamper it, which the coastal state is obligated not to do under 
Article 15 (1). On the other hand, it was concluded that to permit 
the coastal state to require prior authorization of foreign vessels 
desiring to traverse the territorial sea would in :fact place too great 
a burden on the basic right of innocent passage. 
The fundamental and pervasive test in determining the kind and 
extent of regulations which a coastal state may impose upon vessels 
passing through its territorial sea is that "simple and ubiquitous, but 
indispensable, standard of what, considering all relevant policies and 
all variables in context, is reasonable as between the parties." 21 The 
parties in the present situation are (1) the coastal state with its 
justifiable demand for security, as well as peace and good order, and 
(2) the overseas state with its equally justifiable demand for the right 
of innocent passage through the territorial sea because, without this 
r ight "freedom of the high seas for navigation" becomes an empty 
phrase. Since one o£ the primary purposes of navigation is to reach 
a destination requiring passage through some state's territorial sea, 
t he right of innocent passage is vitaL 
Leaving aside for the moment the action of the Conference in re-
jecting the Yugoslav proposal which would have given the coastal 
state the kind of right which State A is now trying to invoke against 
the warship of State B, the question is whether the attempt of State 
A to prohibit the use of its territor ial sea to all vessels, or at least 
all warships, carrying nuclear weapons is reasonable. To ans·wer 
this quest]on it is necessary to emphasize again the right-duty rela-
tionship of the coastal state with all overseas states. The coastal 
21 McDougal and Schlei, "The H ydr ogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful 
1\lleasures for Security," 64 Yale Law Journal 648, 660 (1955) ; Jessup, The 
Law of T erritorial Water s and };f aritime Jurisdiction 9'5 (1927) ; S1nith, The 
Law and Oust01n of the Sea 20 (2nd ed. 1950) . 
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state has the right, a1nong others, to take necessary steps in its ter-
ritorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent and to promul-
gate rules :for :foreign warships. Among its various duties the coastal 
state is charged by Article 15 o£ the Convention with not hampering 
innocent passage of any ship, merchant vessel or warship, through 
the territorial sea. 
It should also be emphasized that the Convention relates the question 
o£ innocence o£ passage to the nature o£ passage itself without regard 
to any acts actually committed in the territorial sea. This being the 
case the basic question is: How could the mere carrying o£ nuclear 
weapons on a warship passing through the territorial sea prejudice 
the "peace, good order or security" o£ a coastal state, absent rather 
weighty evidence that some overt act against the coastal state was 
contemplated or that the mere carrying was ultrahazardous~ 
It is difficult to see how State A could establish that carrying 
nuclear weapons through the territorial sea would endanger her 
security. I£ a warship is traversing the territorial sea en route to 
the high seas to conduct gunnery exercises, which is what State B 
ultimately did, the mere passage through the territorial sea hardly 
endangers the security o£ the coastal state. 0£ course, because o£ the 
known animosity o£ State B toward State A it might be suspected 
that State B contemplated hostile actions against State A either 
now or at some later date. However, this suspicion alone would 
hardly justify a denial o£ the right o£ innocent passage to B's war-
ships just because they were carrying nuclear weapons. 
Several difficult subsidiary questions come quickly to mind: 
(1) I£ the coastal state may :forbid warships carrying nuclear 
weapons to use its territorial sea, may this prohibition be invoked 
at the whim o:f the coastal state, or only after some objectively-veri-
fiable showing o£ need :for the prohibition in order to avoid jeopard-
izing the "peace, good order or security o£ the coastal State~" Since 
the Conference voted against giving the coastal state the right o£ a 
blanket prohibition, it seems clear that the coastal state could :forbid 
warships carrying nuclear weapons to use its territorial sea only i£ it 
were determined to be reasonably necessary :for its own protection. 
The important :fact to remember is that the passage must be innocent. 
Under the Convention passage is deemed to be innocent "so long as it 
is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security o£ the coastal 
State.22 
(2) Assuming that the mere carrying o£ nuclear weapons by a war-
ship automatically destroyed its innocence o£ passage through the 
territorial sea, thus justifying the coastal state in prohibiting such 
22 Art. 14 ( 4) . 
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passage, what steps may be taken to see that the prohibition is effec-
tive? May the coastal state require a certification from the warship 
prior to passage, reserving the right to grant or withhold authoriza-
tion of the passage? May the coastal state search the warship in case 
it doubts the validity of the certification, or merely order the \varship 
out of the territorial sea on the basis of unconfirmed doubts? 
These and other questions suggest that an attempt to administer 
a prohibition against warships merely carrying nuclear weapons while 
passing through the territorial sea of another state might seriously 
hamper innocent passage. In the final analysis the coastal state 
would have no way of knowing in most cases whether nuclear weap-
ons were being carried by a warship without some sort of inspection. 
Such inspection on the high seas is not possible under Article 9 of the 
Convention on the High Seas which accords warships "complete im-
munity :from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State." 23 
While the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
does not contain a similar provision, it is unlikely that any State 
would permit a boarding and inspection of its warships by a coastal 
State while passing through the territorial sea. It is obvious that 
the determination by the coastal state of the presence of nuclear 
we a pons on board a 'varshi p is much more difficult than the deter-
mination of whether a ship's radar is in use, or secured, during pas-
sage through the territorial sea. In the latter case, if the radar equip-
ment is being used, shore detection devices can determine this fact. 
Hence, the Conference reached a logical and correct conclusion 
in denying the coasta.l state the absolute right to forbid the passage 
through the territorial sea of warships carrying nuclear we a pons. 
Moreover, because of the range and destructive power of such weapons, 
little if anything is added to a coastal state's security by insisting that 
a warship with nuclear weapons remain 3.1 miles off the coast with 
a three-mile territorial sea, or 6.1 miles off the coast of a state which 
claims a six-mile limit. 
Notwithstanding the above conclusion, it should be acknowledged 
that under unusual circumstances the coastal state might justifiably 
prohibit the passage of warships carrying nuclear weapons through 
its territorial sea. The Convention gives the coastal state the right 
to "take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage 
which is not innocent," 24 and the further right ''to suspend temporarily 
in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign 
ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security." 25 
23 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 53 and co1T .. l (1958). 
24 Art. 16 ( 1) . 
25 Art. 16 ( 3) . 
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vVhile this latter right of suspension is not permitted in the territorial 
sea of straits which are used for international navigation,26 it would 
apply in our present hypothetical situation which does not involve a 
strait. 
Assuming that all of the conditions of the right of temporary 
suspension of innocent passage are present, especially a showing that 
such suspension is essential for the protection of the coastal state's 
security, the right of suspension would include lesser rights such as 
exclusion of warships for the carrying of nuclear weapons. It is 
clear, however, that the coastal state would have to produce strong 
evidence which vvould reasonably support the security need of tem-
porary suspension, or exclusion for carrying nuclear weapons, in order 
for such drastic action to be lawful under the Convention or, apart 
from the Convention, under the recognized principle of the inherent 
right of self -defense. 
0 onclusion: Since the facts of the present case do not indicate 
any serious danger to the security of State A by the passage of vessels 
(including warships) of foreign states through State A's territorial 
sea with nuclear weapons aboard, the blanket regulations of State 
A. in this regard are invalid. Therefore, State B was within her 
rights in having nuclear weapons aboard her warship and the inno-
cence of her passage through State A's territorial sea was not de-
stroyed by the n1ere presence of such vveapons. 
EVENT II (Gunnery exercise of warship partly within territorial 
sea of State A) 
The next question is vvhether State B's warship violated certain 
provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone by conducting a gunnery exercise, firing both nuclear and non-
nuclear weapons seaward, in an area of the high seas (except for 
one maneuver into the territorial sea) adjacent to a remote and 
sparsely inhabited portion of State A's territory. 
In order to focus attention on the relationship between State A 
and B, we n1ay exclude from consideration the rights and duties of 
State B to other states which might be navigating through, fishing in, 
or otherwise using the area of the high seas affected by the gunnery 
exercise. As a general principle State B vvould have the right to 
use this area of the high seas for gunnery exercises, subject only to 
the duty to accommodate her use to the inclusive uses of other states 
26 Art. 16 ( 4). 
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in order that no user would be unreasonably endangered or impeded.27 
Also, we may put aside consideration of any possible duties which 
State A might have had to all other states for the acts of State B in 
Stat~ A's territorial sea if the Convention had adopted the article pro-
posed by the International La "\V Commission requiring, among other 
things, that the coastal state not allo"\v the territorial sea to be used 
for acts contrary to the rights of other states.28 
It seems clear that any use by State B of State A 's territorial sea 
for a gunnery exercise, whether intentional or unintentional, was a 
violation of the Convention's definition of passage, even though the 
exercise Inay have been quite innocent in not prejudicing the "peace, 
good order or security" of State A . 
The maneuver of the battleship within State A's six-Inile limit, even 
though of short duration, does not constitute "passage" under the Con-
vention which provides, 
"Passage means navigation through the ter ritorial sea for 
the purrpose either of traversing that sea without entering in-
ternal waters, or of proceeding to internal waters, or of 
making for the high seas from internal waters." 29 (italics 
added) 
27 A claim of right to use an area of the high seas for military exercises 
(i.e. gunnery exercises, nuclear weapons testing, ballistic missile firing, etc.) 
constitutes the equivalent of an exclusive use for a limited period of time of 
an area of the high sea because the danger to navigation, fishing, scientific 
research, and other uses of the area during the military exercises is such that 
all states other lthan the State conducting the exercises will, as a rule, stay 
clear of the area. 
The claim of right to use the designated area for the military exercises is 
justified on the ground that this is as valid a use of the high seas as the 
historic ones of navigation and fishing contemplated by Grotius over three 
centuries ago. 
But, it should be recognized that as the weapons increase in magnitude the 
area of the high seas required for the testing also increases enormously. Hence, 
serious impairment of other uses such as navigation, fishing, scientific research, 
etc., may occur unless (a) the period of the tests is reduced to a few weeks, or 
even to a few days, (b) the area is kept to the absolute minimun1 consistent 
with the safety of other concurrent users of the general area, (c) the area 
is selected in relatively isola1ted parts of the high seas little used f or naviga-
tion, fishing, etc., and (d) the military exercises, especially nuclear weapons 
testing, does not result in substantial and continued deprivation of other uses 
because of lingering after effects upon 1the conclusion of the exercises. 
It follows, therefore, that although it appears that the other inclusive users 
are having to do the accommodating to the state conducting the military 
exercises, the latter is burdened with a number of responsibilities to all other 
users as indicated above, plus the obvious duty to a ccom1noda te the other users 
by giving them adequate advance notice of the planned military exercises. 
28 Article 16 ( 1) of I.L.C. final draft articles ( A/3159, 6 ( 1956) ) . 
29 Art. 14(2). 
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Navigation o£ the El Toro in connection 1vith a gunnery exercise 
as in the present case 1vas not for the purpose of traversing the terri-
torial sea. The warship was not traversing State A's territorial sea 
to get through it or to proceed to or £rom int~rnal waters; instead, 
she was using the territorial sea £or another purpose-a gunnery ex-
ercise. True, during the gunnery exercise the El Toro entered the 
territoral sea at one point and left it at another and hence navigated 
through it. But, the navigation was not £or the purpose contemplated 
by the Convention in summarizing the purpose which qriginally gave 
rise to the right o£ innocent passage, namely, to achieve freedom o£ 
navigation through the territorial seas in order to permit ships to 
reach their destinations with the least possible burden on their passage 
consistent with need o£ the coastal state to protect itsel£.30 
Even more important than the £act that the use by State B o£ State 
A's territorial sea was a violation o£ "passage" as defined under the 
Convention on the 'Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, is the £act 
that it was a clear violation o£ State A's sovereignty. This sover-
eignty, derived £rom more than two centuries o£ state practice and 
universally recognized, not\vithstanding disagreement as to the 
precise breadth o£ the territorial sea, provides the coastal state with 
the exclusive use o£ the territorial sea, the subsoil and the airspace 
above the waters, subject only to the right o£ other states to "innocent 
passage." No other state, without ·express permission o£ the coastal 
state, may exploit any use or take any action within the territorial 
sea, whether harmful to the coastal state or not. Thus, an overseas 
state may not fish within the territorial sea, carry on perfectly in-
nocent scientific research, or do anything therein except to navigate 
innocently £or the specific purpose o£ traversing the sea. 
Hence, the action o£ State B in conducting part o£ its gunnery 
exercise within the territorial sea o£ State A, however inadvertent 
it may have been and quite aside £rom whether it did the slightest 
damage to the territorial sea or the sparsely populated coast of State 
A, was a violation o£ State A's sovereignty. Therefore, State A would 
be entitled to protest the breach o£ sovereignty and demand that it 
not be repeated. The £acts do not indicate any damage to State A, 
3° Colombos, International Law of the Sea 98 (3rd rev. ed. 1954) and citations 
therein. Jessup contends that the right of innocent passage historically bad 
nothing to do with the passage of ships bound to or from a port of the State and 
that the right of access to ports should be distinguished from the right of in-
nocent passage. Jessup, ''The International Law Commission's 1954 Report on 
the Regime of the Territorial Sea," 49 A.J.I.L. 221, 226 (1955). Whatever the 
historical origin of the right of innocent passage, the Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and Contiguous Zone now includes the right of access to internal 
watel's under the right of innocent passage. 
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but if any did occur in connection with the breach of sovereignty, 
State B would be liable. 
C. EVENT III (Merchant ship carrying military cargo through ex-
tended territorial sea which extension the flag State has not 
recognized.) 
The first question relates to the effect of an attempt by a coastal 
state to extend its territorial sea through unilateral action and the 
duty, if any, of an overseas state to recognize such an extension when 
the overseas state claims a narrower territorial sea and has filed 
a formal protest against the extension. 
In oft-quoted language of the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Oase, the 
International Court of Justice said, 
"The delimitation of sea areas has always an international 
aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the 
coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it 
is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral 
act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake 
it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other 
States depends upon internationalla w." 31 
It follows from the above language which succinctly summarizes 
the international law on the point, that whereas State A may by 
unilateral act claim an extension of her territorial sea from three to 
six miles, the claim is not binding upon other States. State X, which 
claims a three-mile limit, is not required to recognize the extension. 
Of course, if State X had failed to protest against State A's claim 
of an additional three miles of territorial sea, it might be argued 
after the lapse of a reasonable length of time that State X had tacitly 
agreed to the extension. However, in the present case State X filed 
a formal protest with State A. 
Also, it should be noted that if State X claimed a six-mile ter-
ritorial sea, it follows that she could not object to the extension by 
State A from three to six miles. A state generally may not deny to 
other states rights which it claims for itself.32 Here, however, the 
fact that State X has long claimed only a three-mile territorial sea 
justifies her protest to State A. · 
Thus it may be concluded that as far as State X was concerned 
her merchant ship, The Queen Bee, was travelling in high seas rather 
than in the territorial sea of State A. This being the case, State A 
had no jurisdiction over The Queen Bee and was committing an 
unlawful act in escorting the merchant ship outside the six-mile limit. 
31 I.C.J. Reports, 132 (1951). 
32 See footnote 1. 
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Therefore part (a) of State X's protest was justified. However, 
that part of the protest which asserted that State A's extension has 
no validity under internationalla w, is too broad. State A's extension 
of her territorial sea from three to six miles would be valid under 
international law as to states now claiming a territorial sea of six 
n1iles, and as to states claiming less than six miles but which failed 
to protest after the lapse of a reasonable time. 
Part (b) of State X's protest assumes, without admitting, the 
validity of State A's extension of the territorial sea to. six miles and 
then challenges the right of State A under the Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (1958) to deny the right 
of innocent passage to a vessel carrying military cargo through said 
territorial sea. 
The question here is whether passage through the territorial sea 
loses its innocence by the m,ere transportation of military cargo 'vhen 
no act has been committed by the ship which is prejudicial to the 
"peace, good order or security" of the coastal state. 
The language of the Convention defining innocent passage is some-
what different from the language proposed by the International La "\V 
Commission. The Convention defines innocent passage in the fol-
lovving terms, 
"Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such pas-
sage shall take place in conformity with these articles and 
with other rules of internationalla w ." 33 
On the other hand, the International Law Commission phrased its 
article in terms which placed emphasis upon the commission of acts, 
not the mere passage itself, concluding, 
"Passage is innocent so long as a ship does not use the 
territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to the se-
curity of the coastal State or contrary to the present rules, or 
to other rules of international law." 34 
It is clear that the Passage of The Queen Bee through State A 's 
territorial sea was innocent under the definition of the International 
Law Commission because she did not commit any act during the 
passage which in any way could be considered prejudicial to State 
A's security. 
The question remains as to whether the passage of The Queen 
Bee was prejudicial to the "peace, good order or security" of the coastal 
33 Art. 14 ( 4) . 
34 U.N. Doc. A/3159, 19 (1956). 
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state. What constitutes prejudicial passage is not defined in the 
Convention, nor is there any indication as to whether there must 
be a direct causation between the passage and the prejudice to the 
"peace, good order, or security" of the coastal state. If States A and 
B were at war, then it would be logical to assume that the passage 
of a ship through State A's territorial sea with military cargo bound 
for State B would be prejudicial to State A's "peace, good order or 
security" (quite likely to all three). 
Here, however, despite certain frictions between the two states, 
there is no indication that the military cargo on The Queen Bee bound 
for State B is to he used at some future time against State A and is 
therefore prejudicial, though remotely so, to the "peace, good order 
or security" of State A. This being the case, it is difficult to see how 
State A can lawfully forbid the passage of all ships through her 
territorial sea carrying military cargo bound for State B. 
D. EVENT IV (Coastal state's jurisdiction in territorial sea over 
foreign fishing vessel.) 
A number of questions are involved in Event IV. First, did the 
fishing vessel, The Pelican, violate its right of innocent passage in 
State .A's territorial sea by (a) traversing the territorial sea ap-
proximately one mile landward of the customary sea lane, (b) pro-
ceeding slowly, (c) with fishing nets on board but not secured in 
accordance with the regulations of State A, and (d) taking handline 
soundings and sea bed samples~ 
It appears that The Pelican was conforming to the provisions of 
the Convention in accordance with the definition as provided in 
Article 14 (2) in that she was navigating through the territorial sea 
for the purpose of traversing that sea without entering internal 
waters. Nothing in the convention, or in international law regarding 
the right of innocent passage requires that the overseas ship follow 
a particular sea lane within the territorial sea or be a certain distance 
from the shore, absent specific regulations of the coastal state to in-
sure safety o£ navigation, or for some other justifiable purpose. The 
facts do not indicate the presence of any such regulations. Nor 
does "passage" require that the ship travel at a minimum speed. 
In fact, it may even stop and anchor if such is incidental to the 
passage. 
Therefore5 the real question is whether the passage of The Pelican 
was "innocent," in view of (a) the fact that the fishing nets, although 
on board, vvere not secured in accordance \vith the regulations of 
State· A and/or (b) the :fact that crew /members \Vere taking 
soundings. 
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The Convention contains a specific provision relating to the 
"innocence" of foreign fishing vessels, as follows : 
"Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered 
innocent if they do not observe such laws and regulations as 
the coastal State may make and publish in order to prevent 
these vessels from fishing in the territorial sea." 35 (emphasis 
added.) 
Two things should- be noted about this provision. · First, it \vas 
added at the Conference partly at the urging of Yugoslavia 36 and 
the United Kingdom,37 both of whom introduced proposals for an 
amendment to the International La\v Commission's draft articles. 
The Yugoslav delegate pointed out that fishing vessels presented a 
special proble1n in relation to the right of innocent passage because 
some were equipped with very modern gear that could be lowered 
and taken up rapidly, so that it might be difficult to prevent their 
fishing in the territorial sea of another State while ostensibly 
traversing it for navigational purposes only.3·8 
Secondly, it should be noted that Article 14 (5) of the Convention 
establishes a special requirement for "innocence" of fishing vessels 
and in doing so it creates confusion regarding the provision immedi-
ately preceding in Article 14 ( 4) which says that "passage is innocent 
so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal State." If fishing by a foreign vessel in the territorial 
sea is considered to be prejudicial to the "peace, good order or secu-
rity" of the coastal state then the special requirement regarding the 
"innocence" of fishing vessels is redundant. (It would certainly seem 
that fishing by a foreign vessel in the territorial sea of a coastal State, 
\vhich is a violation of sovereignty, is definitely prejudicial to the 
"good order" of the coastal State.) On the other hand, if fishing by 
a foreign vessel by some semantic choreography is not considered to 
be prejudicial to the "peace, good order or security" of the coastal 
state, then it would have been less confusing if the basic definition of 
"innocence" had been broadened to include "economic well-being" 
along with "peace, good order or security." 
Despite this confusion in and inadequacy of draftsmanship the im-
portant fact for our purpose is to note that the reason for the special 
provision in the Convention regarding passage of fishing vessels 
through the territorial sea was to prevent them from fishing, since 
the coastal state has the universally-recognized exclusive right to fish 
in those waters. 
35 Art. 14(5). 
36 U.N. Doc. A/CONF 13/C.1/L.17 (1958). 
37 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C.1/L.132 (1958). 
38 3 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/39, 76 (1958)). 
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The question then is to decide ·whether The Pelican volated its right 
of innocent passage just because she did not conform to the exact 
regulations promulgated by State A, even though its nets \Vere on 
board and hence not in a position to fish. This is a hard question. 
On the one hand the coastal state has the right under the Convention, 
and apart therefrom, to insure that foreign vessels do not fish in its 
territorial sea. Reasonable regulations of a coastal state requiring 
the securing of fishing equipment are a means for accomplishing that 
end. Hence, if the regulations are reasonable a material violation 
thereof would constitute a breach of innocent passage. 
On the other hand, if the foreign vessel in fact has her nets out of 
the water, with her holds full of fish and no indication of intention to 
fish, should it be considered a violation of innocent passage 1nerely 
because of what might be a ''technical" violation of a precise regula-
tion of the coastal state regarding the securing of fishing gear? 
It would appear somewhat more just to conclude that The Pelican 
\Vas not violating the right of innocent passage. She had Inade an 
effort to secure her fishing nets even though not conforming exactly 
to the regulations prescribed by State A to prevent fishing in the 
territorial sea. This conclusion appears more valid than holding that 
The Pelican violated the rule of "innocent passage," notwithstanding 
some justifiable suspicions on the part of State A resulting from the 
actions of The Pelican in traversing the territorial sea one mile land-
ward of the customary sea lane and cruising slowly late in the 
afternoon. 
The next question is whether the taking of hand-line soundings \vas 
a violation of "innocent passage." It is submitted that it \Vas not 
because the taking of soundings either in the manner indicated here 
or by some other mechanical or electronic device is a normal incident 
to navigation. Thus, the fishing vessel \vas within its rights in taking 
the soundings, notwithstanding the suspicious circumstances surround-
ing the action. 
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to conclude that The Pelican 
was violating ''innocent passage" in having her cre\v take sea bed 
samples since this action is not a normal incident to navigation. 
Moreover, under the circumstances in the case; the sea bed samples \vere 
probably being taken :for the purpose of mapping the submarine ter-
rain or some other ulterior purpose unconnected with mere passage. 
Of course, it might be argued that the sea bed samples were being 
taken for purposes of "fundamental oceanographic or other scientific 
research carried out \vith the intention of open publication," in ac-
cordance with Article 5 (1) of the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. The t\vo rather obvious counter arguments are (a) that the 
above Article applies only to such research outside of the territorial 
152 
sea, and (b) that it is somewhat unlikely that such research vvould 
be conducted by the crew o:f a fishing vessel. 
Therefore, State A vvas justified in escorting The Pelican outside 
the six-mile limit. 
The next question is whether State A had the right under the 
Convention to visit and search The Pelican in order to determine 
vvhether there was a breach of the rules of innocent passage. 
As a general rule during peacetime the vessels o:f one country 
1nay not be visited and searched by the warships o£ another country 
on the high seas. In the territorial sea such visit and search may 
occur only if there exists "probable cause" for suspicion. During 
vvar the rule is contrary as to the high seas; the belligerent is entitled 
to visit and search all n1erchant ships, "the right growing out of, 
and ancillary to, the greater right of capture." 39 
I-Iowever, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone contains an express provision that "the coastal State may take 
the nece8sary 8teps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is 
not innocent." 40 'fhe question then narrows down to whether the 
action of State A vvas a "necessary step'' to prevent what she suspected 
was not "innocent" passage. 
The facts do not indicate whether State A's warships first com-
1nunicated to The Pelican, prior to the boarding, in an attempt to 
ascertain vvhy the fishing vessel was taking soundings and otherwise 
doing things which gave rise to suspicions regarding the innocence 
of her passage. Normally, the action of boarding :for a visit and 
search vvould be justified only after the vessel refused to answer 
questions as to her actions vvhich appeared to be violative of innocent 
passage. 
Here again we find that the coastal state must reach a proper 
balance between its right to take necessary steps in its territorial sea 
to prevent passage which is not innocent and its duty not to hamper 
innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
In the present instance, since The Pelican was delayed by State 
A's warship for only thirty minutes, during which time she 
would have traversed only two additional miles at her slow cruising 
speed at the time, it may be concluded that the visit by the warship 
did not ha1nper The Pelican's innocent passage, assu1ning :for the 
moment that it was innocent. l-Ienee, even though the boarding of 
The Pelican normally should not have been made until she had re-
39 The Nereide, 9 Granch. 338, 427 (1815) ; The II! aria 1 0 . Rob. 340, 360, 
(1799) ; 3 Hyde, International Law 1!)58-1964 (2nd ed., 1945) ; 7 Flackworth, 
Digest of International Law 175-178 (1944) ; Colombos, Op. cit., footnote 30 (at 
615). 
40 Art. 16 (1). 
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fused to answer satisfactorily questions as to her actions, State A's 
action in making the visit n1ay be justified as a "necessary step" to 
prevent passage through her territorial sea which, we concluded 
earlier with respect to the taking of sea bed samples, was not innocent. 
As to the search by the officers of State A's warship, this action 
''appears to have been unjustified under the facts of the case. It "\vas 
hardly necessary to search The Pelican in order to find out why the 
soundings and sea bed samplings were being taken and why the vessel 
"\vas cruising more slowly than normal one-mile landward of the cus-
tomary sea lane. This information probably could have been secured 
by asking questions during the visit unless officers of The Pelican re-
fused to answer, or gave what appeared to be false or evasive answers. 
Of course, it is possible that a search might have been required to 
detern1ine whether the fishing gear had been secured as required by 
State A's regulations, and whether the suspicions that The Pelican was 
planning to fish in State A's territorial sea after dark were justified. 
However, even here it would appear that proper interrogation during 
the visit would have sufficed, "\vithout a physical search of the vessel. 
This is not to say that a boarding party is lin1ited to a visit and may 
never search. On the contrary, a search would be justified and law-
ful "\V hen ever the boarding party has not received satisfactory answers 
to its questions or, despite the answers, it honestly believes that a 
search is a "necessary step" to determine whether the vessel is in fact 
violating the right of innocent passage. 
Under the facts presented here it may be concluded that the search 
of The Pelican was not justified under internationalla w or under the 
Convention as a "necessary step" to prevent a violation of innocent 
passage. 
EVENT IV (Jurisdiction of Coastal State over a criminal, citizen 
of coastal state, aboard foreign vessel). 
The final question is whether State A had any right to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction on board The Pelican in arresting Mr. K., a 
citizen o£ State A, who had committed prior crimes. 
Here the language of the Convention indicates emphatically that 
State A was without jurisdiction, even though Mr. K. was a citizen 
of State A. 
"The coastal State may not take any steps on board a 
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any 
person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any 
crime committed be fore the ship entered the territorial sea, 
if the ship, proceeding from a foreign por~t, is only passing 
607631-61,-----11 
154 
through the territorial sea without entering internal 
waters." 41 (emphasis added) 
Since the crimes of Mr. K. had been committed before the ship 
entered the territorial sea, the officers of the warship were not entitled 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction on board The Pelican. 
Moreover, in order to indicate generally the strict limitations under 
the Convention of the coastal state's right to exercise criminal juris-
diction on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea 
it should be noted that even if Mr. J(. had committed a crime on board 
the ship during its passage, criminal jurisdiction could not be exercised 
except in the following cases : 
" (a) I£ the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal 
State; or 
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the 
country or the good order of the territorial sea; or 
(c) If the assistance o:f the local authorities has been re-
quested by the captain of the ship or by the consul of the 
country whose flag the ship flies; or 
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic 
in narcotic drugs." 42 
It may be concluded that State A violated the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in arresting Mr. IC. on board The 
Pelican and removing him. It matters not that the presence of Mr. 
K. on board the fishing vessel was accidentally discovered. State A's 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction would have been equally in violation 
of the Convention even though it had been known that Mr. K. was 
aboard The Pelican. 
E. GENERAL CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHT 
OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL 
SEA 
It is often difficult to strike an equitable and just balance between 
the coastal state's right to prevent passage through its territorial sea 
which is not innocent and the con1.peting right of overseas states to 
enjoy the right of innocent passage, both for their merchant vessels 
and their warships. In the troubled, insecure world in which we now 
live interpretations of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone by writers, and by judicial and other decision-makers 
in case of disputes, such as the hypothetical situations given above, 
will probably tend to favor the coastal state's regulations and actions 
if they appear at all reasonable as a security measure. 
41 Art.19(5). 
42 Art. 19 (1). 
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While one may understand the present tendency to weight the scales 
slightly in favor of the coastal state in this matter of the right of 
innocent passage, one may hope, without predicting that in time ten-
sions among competing claimants in the world arena will have eased 
to the extent that all disputes will be settled at the negotiation table, 
in an arbitral tribunal, or in the International Court of Justice. In 
such a period of relaxed world tension the "necessary steps" which 
the coastal state would have to take in order to prevent passage which 
is not innocent but instead is prejudicial to its "peace, good order or 
security" would be minimal and the scales could then be weighted in 
favor of the overseas state's right to enjoy innocent passage free from 
numerous protective regulations and actions by the coastal state which 
in varying degrees are bound to hamper passage through the terri-
torial sea. 
Stated another way, given world conditions in which passage 
through the territorial sea both for merchant vessels and warships is 
more likely. to be "innocent" than is the case today, the coastal state 
will have far less need to take as many, or as severe, "necessary steps" 
to prevent non-innocent passage, even though the right of the coastal 
state to take those steps must always be recognized and guaranteed 
either under a Convention or under the inherent right of self-rlefense. 
That the articles of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone tend to favor the coastal state in regard to the "right 
of innocent passage" can be documented. It is hoped that the ana1ysis 
of the problem situations has served as a partial documentation. 
Similarly, as discussed elsewhere, the record of the entire Conference, 
including the other three Geneva Conventions of 1958, indicates a 
rather decided tendency to favor the coastal state on many other 
matterS.43 
This tendency is understandable in view of a variety of motivating 
forces in the world, some of them inimical to the free world, but, by 
and large, it is an unfortunate trend because in the long run the maxi-
mum utilization of the world's greatest common resource-the seas-
can be achieved only by what has been wisely and succinctly sum-
43 Note, for example (a) the strong sentiment toward increasing the breadth 
of the territorial sea to six miles, (b) the vote of the First Committee in favor 
of a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone even though this proposal failed in plenary 
meetings, (c) the recognition of the special interests of the coastal state in the· 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas, (d) the exclusive rights accorded the coastal state to explore and exploit 
continental shelf resources and (e) the increase in the closing line for bays from 
the widely accepted ten miles, at least prior to the dictum in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries Oase (see footnote 1), to fifteen miles in the I.L.C. draft 
articles, to twenty-four miles in the Convention on the Territorial Sea (Art. 
7 ( 4)). 
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marized as an "explicit vveighting of the balance of decision in favor 
of inclusive rather than exclusive uses." 44 
Every time the coastal state is accorded, or attempts to usurp, the 
right to push seaward "a new extension of state competence," 45 there 
must be of necessity a corresponding diminution in the vigorous, 
productive principle of freedom of the high seas which has served for 
three centuries to keep the channels of navigation, communication, 
and commerce open to all users in a shrinking world whose increas-
ingly interdependent states can survive and prosper· only when such 
channels are open. 
Whether one is concerned with the application of the right of 
innocent passage to a problem situation, or with some other article 
of one of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958, it is well to scrutinize 
carefully every regulation promulgated and every action taken by 
the coastal state to see that the overriding princi pie of freedom of 
the seas suffers the least possible infringement commensurate ·with 
the justifiable need of the coastal state to protect itself. As vvith 
human liberty, the price of freedom of the seas is eternal vigilance, 
particularly vigilance against duly constituted authority. 
44 McDougal and Burke, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea : Community Perspec-
tives versus National Egoism," 67 Yale Law Journal 539,588 (1958). 
45 Garcia Amador, The Exploitation and Conservation of The Resources of 
the Sea, 13 et. seq. (1959). I have borrowed his' apt expression, "new extensions 
of state competence" but not his conclusions which are generally contrary to 
mine. Note, for example, his attempt to justify the Santiago Declaration of 
Chile, Ecuador and Peru claiming "exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction" over 
a 200-mile belt of high seas adjacent to their coasts. (Ibid., at 76.) 
